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33. To be sure, there are certainly aspects of their account that I am not ready to accept. For example, it’s 
not at all obvious to me that intellectual humility is really a “subdomain” of humility. While I think it is 
perfectly natural to think that intellectual humility is a special sort of humility, this may very well not be 
the case. For example, if humility is, according to Hook and Davis, “not thinking of oneself too highly 
or lowly” and if intellectual humility involves “having an accurate view of…one’s ideas,” then we might 
instead think humility is actually a subset of intellectual humility—we might think that humility is simply 
having an accurate view of one’s idea about oneself.
34. If the diversity of religious perspectives is largely mutually exclusive (such that, for example, Hinduism 
can’t be true if Judaism is true and vice versa), then that seems to mean that most people are drastically 
misinformed regarding their religious beliefs and convictions. And seemingly that will mean that such 
people will be attributing far more positive epistemic status to their religious beliefs than such beliefs 
actually enjoy, which matches my definition of intellectual arrogance.
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I think we owe a debt of gratitude to Joshua Hook and Don Davis for helping us think through some 
difficult issues surrounding intellectual humility and religious conviction. Their psychological per-
spective was both illuminating and deeply challenging.
While there are certainly areas that I will want to push back on, I was happy to see just how much 
agreement there seems to be between our two opening statements. I think our respective definitions 
of intellectual humility might very well be largely compatible (though, of course, the devil is in the 
details).33 What is more, I think Hook and Davis do an excellent job helping us see at least three 
reasons why religious beliefs and convictions can be so very prone to dogmatism: First, religious 
beliefs are often epistemically foundational and “load-bearing” for large swaths of people’s belief 
structures about themselves and the world around them (call this the load-bearing reason). Second, 
religious beliefs often serve as signals of group loyalty and membership—signals that regulate who 
we listen to, who we trust (call this the group loyalty reason). And third, religious beliefs are often 
taken to be most valuable when held with certainty (call this the assumed certainty reason).
That said, however, Hook and Davis seem to think that this propensity towards religious dogma-
tism is incompatible with intellectual humility. I don’t think that’s necessarily the case. While I would 
agree that religious dogmatism often leads to intellectual arrogance (assuming, of course, that most 
religious views are mutually exclusive), I want to stress that this isn’t necessarily the case.34 As I 
argued in my opening statement, there is theoretical space for virtuous religious dogmatism.
Dogmatism Is Compatible with Intellectual Humility
Consider my belief that 2 + 2 = 4 and my belief that the Holocaust really did happen. Both of these 
beliefs seem to bear the same hallmarks of dogmatism as those identified by Hook and Davis in reli-
gious beliefs. Both of these beliefs are going to play an important role within the belief structure I use 
when trying to understand myself and the world (load-bearing reason). If 2 + 2 ≠ 4, then my entire 
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35. Though arguably there are some areas of widespread agreement. The belief that at least one god exists, 
for example, is one belief that the vast majority of people around the world happen to agree on.
36. Plantinga, 2000, p. 450.
understanding of mathematics, science, logic, and rationality (and everything I apply it to, including 
my understanding of self) would seem to be drastically undermined. Likewise, if the Holocaust really 
didn’t happen, then my entire understanding of history, my trust of others, and the role of authority 
would be drastically undermined. Additionally, I’m guessing most of us would be inclined to alienate 
anyone who seriously denied that 2 + 2 = 4 or that the Holocaust happened (group loyalty reason). 
And I suspect most of us would agree that these sorts of beliefs really should be held with an extremely 
high degree of confidence (the assumed certainty reason). Does this mean that my extremely high 
confidence that 2 + 2 = 4 and that the Holocaust really happened is somehow intellectually vicious? 
Absolutely not. These sorts of beliefs should be held dogmatically, and, I’d suggest, that such dogma-
tism is perfectly compatible with intellectual virtue, with intellectual humility.
As I noted in my opening statement, it may very well be the case that some religious beliefs are also 
compatible with virtuous dogmatism. Just as we can “see” that 2 + 2 = 4, many philosophers of religion 
would want to claim that we can just “see” that God exists. And if all this is right, then some religious 
beliefs might just be the sort of things—like the belief that 2 + 2 = 4—that we can believe with a virtu-
ous dogmatism, with unwavering epistemic commitment, while remaining intellectually humble.
Widespread Disagreement
But someone who wants to resist the claim that intellectual humility is conceptually compatible 
with religious dogmatism might very well point out some salient differences between beliefs like 2 
+ 2 = 4, the Holocaust occurred, and so on, and religious beliefs. In particular, such a person could 
highlight the fact that most every rational and sufficiently informed person believes that 2 + 2 = 4 
and that the Holocaust occurred, while, in contrast, there is very little agreement when it comes to 
religious matters.35 Rational and sufficiently informed people can and do disagree widely regard-
ing the vast majority of religious claims and beliefs. So perhaps it is not so much the fact that 
religious beliefs are taken to be load-bearing group-loyalty identifiers that are prone to enjoy 
assumed certainty that makes them incompatible with intellectual humility. Perhaps it’s those fea-
tures in conjunction with widespread disagreement—a phenomenon that Hook and Davis seem 
rightly concerned about—that forces such religious dogmatism away from intellectual humility.
But then again, perhaps there are cases where dogmatism is permissible even in the face of wide-
spread disagreement. Consider the following case from Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief:
FRISIAN FLAG: The police haul me in, accusing me of a serious crime: stealing your Frisian flag again. 
At the police station, I learn that the mayor claims to have seen me lurking around your back door at the 
time (yesterday midafternoon) the crime occurred; I am known to resent you. I had means, motive, and 
opportunity; furthermore there have been other such sordid episodes in my past. However, I recall very 
clearly spending the entire afternoon on a solitary hike near Mount Baker.36
The protagonist’s belief in FRISIAN FLAG that he is not a thief is presumably fairly foundational and 
epistemically “load-bearing.” After all, it would be quite the epistemic blow if it were the case that his 
distinct memory of hiking Mount Baker and his distinct lack of memory of stealing a Frisian flag 
were somehow deceptive. And such a belief could easily be imagined to be central to the protagonist’s 
group identification. Presumably the protagonist would expect his friends and family to believe him 
when he says he didn’t steal the flag, and presumably he would feel extremely alienated if they didn’t, 
despite his pleading. Finally, the protagonist’s clear and distinct memory of hiking Mount Baker pre-
sumably affords him something close to certainty, and that such conviction is perfectly warranted and 
expected. As such, the protagonist’s belief that he didn’t steal the flag seems to be a load-bearing 
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37. And this might actually be the case for disagreements in general. See Hawthorne and Srinivasan, 2013.
38. Wittgenstein, 1980, 34e.
group-loyalty identifier that is assumed to enjoy something close to certainty. And, more importantly 
for our current purposes, this is a belief that most people disagree with him about.
Most people, let’s assume, who are availed of the information surrounding the protagonist’s 
“means, motive, and opportunity” for purportedly stealing of the flag believe that he actually stole 
it—they believe that he is the thief. Does this mean that if the protagonist were to remain steadfast 
and dogmatic in his insistence that he didn’t steal the flag, that he would be guilty of intellectual 
vice? Surely not! Because he didn’t steal the flag, and he knows he didn’t steal the flag. And so it 
looks like even a belief that is a load-bearing group-loyalty identifier that is assumed to enjoy a 
level of certainty and faces widespread disagreement can nevertheless be dogmatically held while 
remaining intellectually virtuous.
And again, it’s possible some religious beliefs are like this. Suppose a group of people really do, 
truly “see” that God exists and that the convictions of their specific religious tradition are true. 
Such people, it seems, could be just like the protagonist in FRISIAN FLAG. Their religious beliefs 
would be load-bearing group-loyalty identifiers that are assumed to enjoy a level of certainty, even 
in the face of widespread disagreement; even so, if they really see that God exists, if they know that 
God exists, then it seems as though they can remain dogmatic regarding their religious beliefs and 
remain intellectually virtuous, even intellectually humble.
Conclusion
So, in conclusion, I want to suggest that there is nothing necessarily incompatible with intellec-
tual humility and dogmatically holding to religious beliefs that are load-bearing group-loyalty 
identifiers that are assumed to enjoy a level of certainty while facing extensive and widespread 
disagreement. But it is important to note just how weak this conclusion is. I’m not suggesting 
that all instances of religious dogmatism are compatible with intellectual humility. Far from it! I 
am happy to agree that most people end up attributing to their religious beliefs (including anti-
religious beliefs) far more positive epistemic status than they really deserve; I’m happy to agree 
that most people end up holding their religious beliefs with a degree of intellectual arrogance. 
Nevertheless, what I want to suggest is that it is at least possible to be in a situation where one 
can be dogmatic about one’s religious beliefs while being intellectually humble.
But how can I know if I’m in such a situation? Someone might claim to just “see” that a god of 
a certain sort exists. And someone else might claim to “see” that a very different god exists. How 
can we tell who’s in the right sort of relationship with the truth? That’s the trick. That’s the rub.37 
And as I think Hook and Davis have shown us, we’re notoriously bad at judging these sorts of 
things. As Wittgenstein said, “Nothing is so difficult as not deceiving oneself.”38 So while I think 
an understanding of intellectual humility can help us appreciate just what is going wrong in cases 
of intractable religious disagreements, perhaps it cannot ultimately resolve such disagreements. 
Personally, I’m okay with that. It leaves room for other virtues to play their role—virtues like kind-
ness, honesty, and plain old humility.
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